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ATTORNEY GENERAL'S WARNING: LEGISLATION MAY Now
BE HAZARDOUS TO TOBACCO COMPANIES' HEALTH
INTRODUCTION
"My intuitive feeling is, we've got the start of a runaway forest fire here
for the tobacco industry." 1
History has been kind to cigarette manufacturers. The tobacco industry
has been able to douse the numerous individual product liability lawsuits that
now have the appearance of small camp fires.2 However, a spark escaped
when two states recently filed suits against various manufacturers to recover
health care costs for smoking-related illnesses among state employees.3 The
fire began to burn brighter when the Florida Legislature amended the state's
Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act4 to allow the state's Attorney General to
sue tobacco manufacturers to recover of Medicaid payments made due to ill-
nesses resulting from the use of tobacco products.5 The "forest fire" has now
spread to the federal legislature. Senators Frank R. Lautenberg (D-New Jer-
sey) and Tom Harkin (D-Jowa) recently introduced a bill6 based upon the new
Florida statute.7 The two pieces of legislation both contain language that
could prove to be extremely harmful to the health of tobacco industry profits.'
Public policy requires this new wave of legislation and litigation. With-
out it, taxpayers will be required to absorb huge costs, and cigarette manufac-
turers will continue to escape liability for the harm that their products cause.9
However, a tobacco industry spokesperson has vowed to challenge the new
1. Maria Mallory, Florida May Kick the Tar Out of Tobacco, Bus. WK., July 4, 1994, at 29
(quoting Robert McKnight, executive vice-president of the Florida Chamber of Commerce).
2. The tobacco industry has faced numerous lawsuits over the past four decades that were
brought by individual plaintiffs. See infra pp. 32-46. To date, the industry has never paid
any amount of compensation to individuals with smoking-related illnesses. See Donald W.
Garner, Cigarette Dependency and Civil Liability: A Modest Proposal, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
1423, 1425 (1980).
3. Nationline: Tobacco Suit, USA TODAY, June 8, 1994, at 3A. In May, Mississippi sued
thirteen tobacco companies to recover funds expended on hospital care required by state
employees due to smoking-related illnesses. Id. West Virginia Attorney General Darrell
McGraw Jr. announced his intentions to file a similar suit. Id.
4. Medicaid Third Party Liability Act, 1994 Fla. Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 94-251, § 4 (codified
as amended at FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 409.910 (West 1994)).
5. H.R. 71, 1994 Spec. Sess. D § 9, FLA. STAT. ANN. ch. 409.910 (West 1994).
6. S. 2245, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
7. 140 Cong. Rec. S7784-04, S7784 (daily ed. June 28, 1994) (statement of Sen. Lautenberg).
8. See infra notes 19-29.
9. It has been estimated that the Medicare program will incur $800 billion in expenditures
over the next twenty years due to tobacco-related illnesses. 140 Cong. Rec. S7784-04, S7784
(referring to a Columbia University Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse Report).
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Florida law."0 The stage has been set for another wave" of litigation that could
seriously burn the tobacco industry.
Part I examines the significant aspects of the revised Florida statute and
the proposed federal Senate bill. 12 Part II reviews the development and cur-
rent status of the laws in Florida, Ohio, and federal courts in regards to the
toxic tort 13 theories included in the legislation. 4 Part III of this Comment
provides a review of the judicial treatment of tobacco cases and past legisla-
tive actions toward tobacco.15 Part IV discusses the due process challenge that
could be advanced by the tobacco industry. 6 Finally, Part V concludes with
predictions as to the likely success the Medicaid Third-Party Act 7 will have
in achieving its goals, and as to the tobacco industry's ability to contain the
heightened forest fire.18
PART I: RECENT LEGISLATIVE ACTIONS
The Florida Legislation
Florida's newly amended Section 409.910 has numerous features that
ease the State's burdens in maintaining a case against cigarette manufactur-
10. Michelle Healy, Florida Can Sue Tobacco Firms For Illness Costs, USA TODAY, May
27, 1994, at ID. Tom Lauria, spokesperson for the Tobacco Institute, called the legislation
"a travesty and poor public policy." Id.
11. Two distinct "waves" of litigation regarding cigarette manufacturer liability have been
recognized to date. See infra pp. 32-46. See also Paul G. Crist & John M. Majoras, The
"New" Wave in Smoking and Health Litigation - Is Anything Really So New?, 54 TENN. L.
REV. 551, 552 (1987).
12. See infra notes 19-30.
13. This Comment examines tobacco (especially cigarettes, due to the nicotine content) as
a product that could be included in the category of toxic tort cases. Toxic tort cases have
been defined as:
[T]hose in which the plaintiff seeks compensation for harm allegedly caused by exposure
to a substance that increases the risk of contracting a serious disease, but does not cause
an immediately apparent response. These cases generally involve a latency period of
latency or incubation prior to the onset of the disease. In most cases the increased risk
of the disease does not diminish or dissipate, even with the cessation of exposure. ...
The vast majority of toxic tort cases, however, are related to cancer and the issue of
carcinogenesis....
Bert Black & David E. Lilienfeld, Epidemiological Proof in Toxic Tort Litigation, 52
FORDHAM L. REV. 732, 733 n.1 (1984).
14. See infra pp. 7-32.
15. See infra pp. 32-46.
16. See infra pp. 46-50.
17. See 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 94-251, § 4 (West).
18. See infra pp. 50-61.
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ers. First, lawmakers abrogated typical defenses used by defendant manufac-
turers.1 9 The specific defenses of comparative negligence, assumption of risk,
and the catch-all phrase of "all other affirmative defenses normally available"
were added by the statue as it was enacted on July 1, 1994.2 The second major
addition was the concept of joint and several liability.21
The largest and most significant provisions added to the statute allow the
Attorney General to seek recovery under a single proceeding (effectively a
class action), require the evidence code to be liberally construed, allow cau-
sation to be proven by use of statistical evidence, abolish the need to identify
individual recipients under certain circumstances, and allow the Attorney
General to proceed under a market share theory.22 The last important addition
19. 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 94-25 1, § 4. Abrogation of defenses was consistent with
the intent of the legislature to hold tobacco companies liable, even though tobacco is not
specifically mentioned in the amended statute. However, tobacco is mentioned in the House
Summary of the initial bill text. See H.R. 71, 1994 Spec. Sess. D. 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv.
ch. 94-251, § 4 states:
(1) It is the intent of the Legislature ... Principles of common law and equity as to
assignment, lien, subrogation, comparative negligence, assumption of risk, and all
other affirmative defenses normally available to a liable third party, are to be abrogated
to the extent necessary to ensure full recovery by Medicaid from third-party resources;
such principles shall apply to a recipient's right to recovery against any third party,
but shall not act to reduce the recovery of the agency pursuant to this section. The
concept of joint and several liability applies to any recovery on the part of the agency.
It is intended that if the resources of a liable third party become available at any time,
the public treasury should not bear the burden of medical assistance to the extent of
such resources. Common law theories of recovery should be liberally construed to
accomplish this intent.
20. 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. 409.910, § 4 (1)(West).
21. "A liability is said to be joint and several when the creditor may demand payment or
sue one or more of the parties to such liability separately, or all of them together at his
option." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 837 (6th. ed. 1990). The term also refers to "a liability
that a business either shares with other tort-feasors or bears individually without the others".
Id.
22. 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 94-251, § 4 (9) states:
In the event that medical assistance has been provided by Medicaid to more than one
recipient, and the agency elects to seek recovery from liable third parties due to actions
by the third parties or circumstances which involve common issues of fact or law, the
agency may bring an action to recover sums paid to all such recipients in one proceeding.
In any action brought under this subsection, the evidence code shall be liberally
construed regarding the issues of causation and of aggregate damages. The issue of
causation and damages in any such action may be proven by use of statistical analysis.
(a) In any action under this subsection wherein the number of recipients for which
medical assistance has been provided by Medicaid is so large as to cause it to be
impracticable to join or identify each claim, the agency shall not be required to so
identify the individual recipients for which payment has been made, but rather can
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to the Florida statute prevents any Medicaid recipient from joining the law-
suit as a party to the action.
23
The Proposed Federal Legislation
The federal proposal has been titled the Medicare and Medicaid Third
Party Liability Act. 4 This Senate Bill contains the same provisions as the
amended Florida statute25 except for four (4) significant items. The first
important difference is the deletion of the abrogation clause contained in the
Florida statute.26 The Senate bill does not contain a similar provision. 27 Sec-
ondly, the federal bill allows the use of statistical evidence, epidemiological
evidence, or both, to prove the issue of causation. 2s Thirdly, the federal bill
also provides for an alternative means of recovery under a theory of concerted
action or enterprise liability. 29 The last difference in the legislation is the
(b) In any action brought pursuant to this subsection wherein a third party is liable due
to its manufacture, sale, or distribution of a product, the agency shall be allowed to
proceed under a market share theory, provided that the products involved are
substantially interchangeable among brands, and that substantially similar factual or
legal issues would be involved in seeking recovery against each liable third party
individually.
23. 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 94-251, § 4 (12)(a) states:
... The provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any actions brought pursuant to
subsection (9), and in any such action, no notice to recipients is required, and the
recipients shall have no right to become a party to any action brought under such
subsection.
24. S. 2245, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
25. Highlights of the bill include recovery based on a class of recipients, causation proven
through statistical evidence, and allowance of a market share theory. Id.
26. See 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 94-251, § 4, supra note 19.
27. See S. 2245, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). Nowhere in the bill, in present form, are the
defenses mentioned or removed.
28. S. 2245 (c), 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) states: Rules Of Evidence.
In any action brought under this section, the Federal Rules of Evidence shall be
construed, regarding the introduction and probative value of evidence on the issues of
causation and damages, in order to effectuate the purpose of this Act to the greatest
extent possible. The issues of causation and damages in any such action may be proven
by the use of statistical analysis or epidemiological evidence, or both.
29. S. 2245 (d), 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) states: Share of Liability.
In any action brought under this section in which a third party is liable due to its
manufacture, sale, or distribution of a tobacco product, the Attorney General shall be
allowed to proceed under a market share theory, if the products involved are substantially
interchangeable and substantially similar factual or legal issues would be involved in
seeking recovery against each liable third party individually. In the alternative, the
Attorney General shall be allowed to proceed under a theory of concerted action or
enterprise liability, or both, if warranted by the facts presented to the court.
[Vol. 28:2
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express intent of the introducing Senators to limit the recovery actions to
tobacco manufacturers.*3
PART II: DETERMINING THE CULPABLE PARTY
Causation Requirements
One of the largest problems with toxic tort cases has been the ability to
prove actual causation.31 The most basic principles of causation require a
reasonable connection between the act of the defendant and the damage suf-
fered by the plaintiff.32 As Prosser states:
[L]egal responsibility must be limited to those causes which are so closely
connected with the result and of such significance that the law is justified
in imposing liability. Some boundary must be set to liability for the con-
sequences of any act, upon the basis of some social idea of justice or
policy.33
The tort system has conventionally used the preponderance of the evi-
dence rule to resolve the causal connection problem.34 The plaintiff must
introduce evidence that leads to the conclusion that more likely than not, the
defendant was a substantial factor in bringing about the result.35 Black's Law
Dictionary defines "preponderance of evidence":
As standard of proof in civil cases, is evidence which is of greater weight
or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it;
that is evidence which as a whole shows that the fact sought to be proved
is more probable than not. Braud v. Kinghen, La. App., 310 So. 2d 657,
But see Henry J. Reske, New Torts Restatement Debated, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1994, at 24.
(discussing the proposed AL's RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 402A that indicates a
trend away from the consumer expectation theory of strict products liability with the Institute's
adoption of a risk-utility balancing test standard for design defects).
30. See 140 CONG. REC. S7784-04, S7786 (daily ed. June 28, 1994) (statement of Sen.
Harkin). Senator Harkin stated " Tobacco is the only product on the market today that when
used as intended causes death, disease, and disability. It is a product that deserves to be
singled out and treated differently." Id. Senate Bill 2245 specifically includes the words
"tobacco products" in § (3)(a)(1) & § (3)(d) which contain the potential effect of this legislation
to a single industry.
31. See infra notes 146 and 170.
32. W. L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 41, at 236 (4th ed. 1971).
33. Id. at 237.
34. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 857 (1984).
35. PROSSER, supra note 32, at 241.
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659. With respect to burden of proof in civil actions, means greater weight
of evidence, or evidence which is more credible and convincing to the
mind. That which best accords with reason and probability. The word
"preponderance" means something more than "weight"; it denotes a su-
periority of weight, or outweighing. The words are not synonymous, but
substantially different .... It is that degree of proof which is more prob-
able than not ... .36 (emphasis added).
The First Step - Causation Relaxation?
The ability to introduce evidence into federal court is governed by the
Federal Rules of Evidence,3 7 with the majority of states adopting some ver-
sion of the rules that apply to state cases. 8 Evidence is generally admissible
if it is relevant and helpful to the factfinder in the decision making process.39
Only evidence that is prejudicial, confusing, or misleading should be
excluded.4"
Medical and scientific evidence is of specific concern to this Comment.
Both plaintiffs and defendants use medical experts to introduce scientific
evidence and lend credibility to their arguments.4" Testimony of experts is
covered by Article 7 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 42 As long as a witness
qualifies as an expert, 43 he can present an opinion based upon facts obtained
through firsthand observation, presentation at trial, or prior review of data
36. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990). See also In re Dillon, 620 N.E.2d
302, 304 (Ohio Court of Claims June 2, 1993) (discussing burden of proof on applicant for
award of reparations).
37. FED. R. EVID., Pub. L. No. 93-595, § 1, 88 Stat. 1929 (1975) (now codified at 28
U.S.C.A. (West 1984)).
38. JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET. AL., EVIDENCE: 1993 RULES, STATUTES, AND CASE
SUPPLEMENT iii (1993). As of January 1, 1993, thirty-four (34) states and Puerto Rico had
adopted a form of the Federal Rules. Florida adopted the rules in 1979 ( See FLA. STAT. ANN.
ch. 90.101-90.958 (West 1979)) and Ohio did the same in 1980 ( See OHIO R. EVID.).
39. FED. R. EvID. 401 (Definition of "Relevant Evidence") states: "'Relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence
to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence."
40. FED. R. EvID. 403 (Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion,
or Waste of Time) states: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues,
or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."
41. Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 13, at 738.
42. See FED. R. EVID. 702 -706. Rule 701 is not applicable to this section of the Comment
because it deals with lay witnesses.
43. A witness can qualify as an expert through knowledge, skill, experience, training or
education. FED. R. EvID. 702. See State v. Buell, 489 N.E.2d 795, 802 n.5 (Ohio 1986)
(stating that OHIO R. EVID. 702 is an exact transcription of the federal rule) cert. denied,
[Vol. 28:2
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before entering the courtroom."
The long standing standard for the use of scientific tests was developed
in Frye v. United States." The appellant in the case had been convicted of
second degree murder.4 6 At trial, the appellant attempted to introduce the
results of a systolic blood pressure deception test through an expert.4 7 The
trial court refused to allow the use of this evidence 8.4  The Court of Appeals
affirmed because it was not confident that the systolic blood pressure decep-
tion test had gained acceptance or been proven by the scientific community.
49
Therefore, from 1923 until the adoption of the more liberal Federal Rules of
Evidence, expert testimony was required to be based upon a principle or dis-
covery that was "sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance
in the particular field in which it belongs."50
However, in 1993, the United States Supreme Court decided Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc." The case was a products liability claim
for alleged birth defects caused by the mother's ingestion of the drug
Bendectin.52 The defendant presented an expert witness, a physician - epide-
miologist, to testify that the drug was not a human teratogen5 3 that caused birth
107 S.Ct. 240 (1986); State v. Douglas, No. 16616, 1994 WL 466717, at *2 (Ohio App. 9
Dist. Aug. 31, 1994) (qualification of an expert witness "is within the sound discretion of the
trial court and will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of that discretion." (quoting State v.
Jones, Summit App. No. 1198 1/1 1997, unreported at 8 (July 24, 1985)).
44. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note. It should be noted that the committee
did not desire that all data be introduced by any expert. The notes state that the data must "be
of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field." Id.
45. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). Contra Andrews v. State, 533 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th Dist.
Ct. App. 1988) (holding Frye test may exclude reliable evidence, therefore Florida would
adopt a relevancy approach in accepting DNA "fingerprinting"); State v. Johnston, 529 N.E.2d
898, 905 (Ohio 1988) (rejecting the Frye test and adopting an individualized inquiry test for
the admission of testimony that was recollected through hypnosis).
46. Frye, 293 F. at 1013.
47. Id. at 1014.
48. Id. The expert scientist had administered the test prior to trial. The first attempt to
have him explain the results was denied. The defendant then offered to perform the test in
front of the jury in the courtroom, but was once again denied permission. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. The Frye test has been classified as a very strict requirement. See Biskup v.
McCaughtry, 20 F.3d 245, 252 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that Frye is used where strict
exclusionary rules are desired); United States v. Farrar, 25 M.J. 856, 857 (C.M.A. 1988)
(stating that the Court of Military Appeals abandoned the strict Frye test in United States v.
Mustafa, 22 M.J. 165 (C.M.A. 1986)), aff'd, 28 M.J. 387 (C.M.A. 1989); Cf James E. Starrs,
Frye v. United States Restructured and Revitalized: A Proposal to Amend Federal Evidence
Rule 702, 26 JURIMETRICS J. 249, 258 (1986).
51. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
52. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
53. Id. A teratogen is anything that can cause the development of abnormal structures in an
Fall/Winter 1995]
7
Richardson: Attorney General's Warning
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1995
AKRON LAW REVIEW
defects. 4 The plaintiff countered with eight (8) experts who concluded that
Bendectin actually caused the defects.5" The plaintiff's experts based their
conclusions on test tube and animal studies, along with a new review of pre-
viously published human studies.5 6 The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendant because application of the Frye standard excluded
plaintiff's evidence from consideration. 57 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision.
5 8
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the Frye test had been super-
seded by the Federal Rules of Evidence.59 The Court held that the drafters of
the rules did not mention Frye and that a continuation of the rigid standard
would conflict with the "liberal thrust" of the Federal Rules. 60 For purposes
of admitting scientific, statistical, and epidemiological evidence, it is now the
responsibility of the trial judge to ensure the expert testimony is relevant and
reliable.
6 1
Acceptance of Statistical Evidence
As evidenced by the decision in Daubert, the law must evolve and keep
pace with science as it advances through the refinement of mathematics and
statistical analysis. The proper use and interpretation of statistical evidence
embryo resulting in a severely deformed fetus. CLARENCE W. TABER, TABER'S CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY 1835-6 (Clayton L. Thomas ed., 16th ed. 1989). Taber's provides a
table of teratogenic and fetotoxic drugs which includes diethylstilbestrol and tobacco smoking.
Id. at 1834-35.
54. 113 S. Ct. at 2791.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 2791-92.
57. Id. at 2792. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570
(S.D. Cal. 1989), aff'd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
58. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
59. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793. Contra Olvera v. Florida, 641 So. 2d 120, 121 n.1 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (restating that the Florida Supreme Court in Flanagan v. State, 625
So. 2d 827, 828-89 (Fla. 1993) refused to accept Daubert and Florida would continue to use
Frye standard for novel scientific evidence).
60. 113 S. Ct. at 2794.
61. Id. at 2795. The Court provided some guidelines for determining the reliability of
evidence:
1) Has the theory or technique been tested?;
2) Has the theory been subjected to peer review and publication?;
3) What is the known or potential rate of error?; and
4) Is there actually "general acceptance" of the theory?
[Vol. 28:2
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for the purpose of proving causation has become an area of great discussion. 62
Smith v. Rapid Transit63 is a frequently cited case that provides a simple foun-
dation for understanding the use of mathematics for proof of causation.
In Smith, the plaintiff was forced off the road by a bus which caused her
vehicle to hit a parked vehicle. 64 A suit was filed even though she was unable
to positively identify the bus through description.65 At trial, she attempted to
prove the culpability of the defendant by producing evidence that he owned
a bus and operated a bus line on the same street where her accident occurred.
66
However, the court stated that this proof was mere conjecture because noth-
ing prohibited other buses from also using the street for passage. 67 The math-
ematics of the evidence offered by the plaintiff only showed that the
defendant's bus may have caused the accident. 68 The inability to present
additional evidence led to the dismissal of the claim.69
Even though Smith was decided by a Massachusetts court, the case illus-
trates how Ohio law has developed with respect to the use of statistical evi-
dence. A statement by Judge Grey demonstrates the important role math-
ematical principles have played in decisions by Ohio courts. 70 In applying
Id. at 2796-97.
This last guideline is not an absolute requirement as it was in the Frye test; it is now
only an inquiry to help determine if the court should be skeptical. Id. at 2797. See, e.g.,
United States v. Lee, 25 F.3d 997 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that Federal Rule of Evidence
702 applied to both the ability of an expert to testify about scientific concepts and about the
actual application of the concepts). See also Chikovsky v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 832
F. Supp. 341, 346 (S.D. Fla. 1993) (by applying the four guidelines of Daubert, the court
disqualified the plaintiff's expert because his opinion was not based on valid scientific
principles; his testimony was deemed not reliable under the criteria of Rule 702). In the
application of the principles stated above, courts have decided in eleven (11) toxic tort cases
against the admittance of novel scientific evidence, while allowing introduction in only two
(2). Peter Huber, Fact Versus Quack, FORBES, July 4, 1994, at 132.
62. See generally Ann Taylor, Public Health Funds: The Next Step In The Evolution Of
Tort Law, 21 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 753 (1994); Joseph Sanders, From Science To
Evidence: The Testimony On Causation In The Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1993);
Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 Minn. L. Rev. 1219 (1987).
63. 58 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945).
64. Id. at 754-55.
65. Id. at 755.
66. Id. The defendant conceded that he operated three bus lines within the city; one of
which was located on the street where the plaintiff incurred the accident. Id. at 755 n.1.
67. Id. at 755.
68. Id. The court stated that it was insufficient to use mathematics to only show that
chances favor the hypothesis to be proven; the proposition must still be proven by a
preponderance of the evidence, citing Sargent v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 29 N.E.2d 825,
827 (Mass. 1940).
69. Smith, 58 N.E.2d at 755.
70. See State v. Wooten, 1989 WL 74880, at *27 (Athens Co. C.A. June 29, 1989) (Grey,
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these principles, a number of cases decided in Ohio have distinguished
between possibility and probability.7
In State v. Ho 1t,7 2 the defendant had been convicted of rape.73 The state's
expert had conducted a Neutron Activation Analysis of a sample of the
victim's pubic hairs and hairs found in the defendant's clothing. 74 The expert
could only testify that the hair samples were similar and were likely to be from
the same person. 75 The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the conviction because
the interpretation of scientific facts must be based on probabilities, not pos-
sibilities.76 The court reasoned that "likely" means something less than
probable and therefore, the expert's testimony was confusing and misleading
to the jury.
77
The court continued to clarify the distinction in Cooper v. Sisters of
Charity of Cincinnati, Inc. 71 In this medical malpractice case, the court held
that proof of the proximate cause of the injury had to be expressed in terms of
probability. 79 The terms "maybe" and "around" do not suggest probability
because they do not mean "more likely than not."" ° The threshold is a defini-
tive statement that the event has a greater than fifty percent (50%) probabil-
ity of occurring.8'
J., dissenting) (arguing that incompetent evidence disguised as expert testimony is prejudicial
per se, the judge stated that courts have applied the laws of mathematics and statistical
probability just as they have applied the laws of the legislature).
71. One of the leading cases is Shumaker v. Oliver B. Cannon & Sons, Inc., 504 N.E.2d 44
(Ohio 1986). The plaintiff alleged that he developed pancreatic cancer as a result of his
exposure to toxic fumes from a sealant applied by the defendant. Id. at 45. An expert
testified on the plaintiff's behalf, but stated that with a reasonable degree of probability, the
exposure "could" have caused the cancer. Id. at 46. Because of the qualifying word "could",
the court held the expert's testimony only amounted to the possibility, not a probability. Id.
at 47.
72. 246 N.E.2d 365 (Ohio 1969).
73. Id. at 365.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 367-68.
76. Id. at 368.
77. Id. at 367-68.
78. 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971). (A boy had suffered a head injury from a bicycle accident.
The defendant treated the child in the emergency room, but did not concentrate his examination
on the portion of the head that eventually led to the brain hemorrhaging causing the death).
79. Id. at 103.
80. Id. at 104. The expert witness had reviewed the medical records and determined that
the child may have survived surgery with around a fifty percent (50%) chance if the medical
procedures would have been performed by the defendant. Id.
81. Id. at 104. See Stinson v. England, 633 N.E.2d 532, 538 (Ohio 1994) (medical
malpractice claim requiring an expert opinion of a causative event to be expressed in terms
of probability); Lee v. Metrohealth Medical Center, No. 62430, 1993 WL 158250, at *10
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered the scientific evidence
acquired through DNA testing for use in a rape trial.8 2 The defendant was
convicted and appealed on the grounds that DNA test results were not gener-
ally accepted nor admissible under the Frye standard. 3 The court of appeals
held that the Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded the Frye test,84 but it
stated its preference for a balancing test to determine if the reliability of the
evidence outweighed the potential negative impact on the jury.85 After sub-
jecting the test procedure to scrutiny under the five factors, the court ruled that
the DNA results were properly admitted as scientific evidence and upheld the
conviction.
8 6
Value of Epidemiological Evidence
Another form of evidence used in mass and toxic torts litigation to prove
causation is epidemiological studies. 7 Epidemiology is the science of defin-
(Ohio App. 8 Dist. May 13, 1993) (medical malpractice case where expert testimony only
concluded causation was a possibility, not a probability), dismissed, 619 N.E.2d 1026 (Ohio
1993).
82. United States v. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104
(1992).
83. Id. at 789. The prosecution obtained semen samples from the defendant and from the
victim when she was treated at the hospital following the attack. Id. The expert concluded
that the probability of the occurrence of the defendant's genotype was one (1) in three hundred
million (300,000,000) in white males. Id. at 793.
84. Id. at 794. It is interesting to note this declaration by the court of appeals occurred
prior to the Daubert decision.
85. Id. (restating the five stage balancing test that it had announced in United States v.
Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198-99 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979)). The
balancing test requires consideration of the following factors:
1) The potential rate of error;
2) The existence and maintenance of standards;
3) Care and concern which scientific technique has been utilized and whether it appears
susceptible to abuses;
4) The existence of a relationship to other scientific tests that have their results regularly
admitted into evidence; and
5) The presence of a fail-safe trait or the probability that a false or misleading test
result will be to the defendant's benefit or detriment. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 794
(summarizing the factors set forth in Williams).
Contra United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that DNA
tests were so potentially influential to the jury that a stricter standard than Frye should be
adopted within that jurisdiction), reh'g granted, 925 F.2d 1127 (8th Cir. 1991).
86. Jakobetz, 955 F.2d at 800.
87. Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to the Problem
of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L. J. 189, 201 (1992).
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ing and explaining the interrelationships of factors that determine disease
frequency and distribution.88 As the definition implies, the epidemiologist
uses statistical methods in an attempt to quantifiably link a specific factor to
a disease that appears within a selected population. 89 In toxic tort litigation,
an observational study is usually performed by an epidemiologist.9' The study
is retrospective in nature because of the long latency period associated with
most toxic substances. 91 The final output of a study is a statement of the in-
cidence rate. 92 "The incidence rate is a measure of the probability that an
individual will develop the disease" being studied if he is exposed to the
specific factor used in the study. 93 This allows the causal link to be expressed
in a probabilistic sense. 94
Epidemiological evidence was discussed at length in the case of In re
Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation.95 The plaintiff was
a widow who brought a wrongful death action claiming that her husband died
from colon cancer that was caused by exposure to asbestos. 96 The plaintiff
presented two expert witnesses who relied upon the decedent's medical
88. TABER, supra note 53, at 606.
89. Black and Lilienfeld, supra note 13, at 755. Along with statistics, the researcher also
employs the rules and methods from the disciplines of sociology and demography. These
areas form the parameters of a particular study by indicating a general correlation between a
factor and a disease. This leads the researcher to an initial hypothesis that will be tested. Id.
at 754-55.
90. Id. at 755-56. Two types of studies can be employed: experimental and observational.
Id. at 755. The experimental method involves 1) the determination of a population to be
studied and 2) a controlled, systematic exposure of a subset of the group to the item being
studied. Id. at 756. This type of study produces results that are very conclusive, but it is
often impossible to use this method due to the undesirable nature of exposing people to
certain risks. Id. The observational method allows the scientist to study individuals who
have already been diagnosed and classified by exposure status (such as smoker or non-smoker).
Id. The researcher can watch these groups over a period of time (prospective study), review
the past exposure (retrospective study), or consider the current exposure (cross-sectional
study). Id. The purpose of all the studies would be to statistically determine the incidence
rate of lung cancer (in this example) between the classified groups. Id. at 756.
91. Id. at 759.
92. Id. at 754.
93. Id. This statement of the rate of incidence is most reliable when the study is performed
with human subjects (not animal), the confidence intervals have been kept small (by using a
large population base and precise measurement techniques), and the data passes various tests
that indicate bias in the results. Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links:
The Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
469, 509-12 (1988).
94. Brennan, supra note 93, at 509.
95. 758 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev'd, 964 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1992).
96. Id. at 200.
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records and epidemiological evidence in reaching their conclusion that asbes-
tos exposure probably caused the colon cancer. 9 The trial court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment, relying on a requirement that the
plaintiff establish a greater than fifty percent (50%) probability that the
defendant's action caused the cancer. 98 The court stated that the epidemio-
logical study must demonstrate a relative risk factor greater than two (2.0) if
no clinical evidence is offered to prove causation.9 9
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded. 0 0 It
determined that the plaintiff presented enough evidence to survive a summary
judgment.' 0 The court stated since both clinical and epidemiological evi-
dence had been presented,'02 the epidemiological evidence alone did not have
to be relied upon for proving causation. 0 3 The court declined to discuss the
97. Id. at 201.
98. Id. at 202, (citing In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation, 597 F. Supp. 740,
785 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988)).
99. Id. at 202. The relative risk is a ratio that expresses the likelihood that a person who is
exposed to a toxic substance will contract the disease being studied versus a person who was
not exposed. Id. A relative risk of one (1.0) means that the toxic substance does not affect
the rate of disease among the population being studied. Id. A relative risk of two (2.0)
doubles the chances that the toxic substance caused the disease in the person that was exposed.
Id. The following is a simple illustration of how relative risk is determined:
Two sample populations would be selected at random on the basis of exposure to a
toxic substance (nicotine, for example). The first group would be a control group that was
not exposed to nicotine. One hundred (100) people are found to have lung cancer anyway.
The second group would contain only persons exposed to nicotine. One hundred fifty (150)
people are found to have lung cancer in this group. The relative risk would be one and a half
(1.5).
The court reasoned that epidemiology cannot show which fifty (50) persons contracted
cancer as a result of the exposure; therefore there was a one in three chance that the particular
plaintiff should be compensated for injuries. Id. at 202. Because this equates to a probability
of only thirty-three percent (33%), summary judgment must be granted because a plaintiff is
unable to produce evidence that would satisfy the fifty-percent (50%) burden for a showing
of the preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 202-03.
100. In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 964 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.
1992).
101. Id. at 96.
102. Id. at 96-97. The court of appeals considered the plaintiff's own medical records to
be clinical evidence. Id. at 97. The experts used these records, as well as epidemiological
studies, their personal knowledge, and the removal of other possible causes of cancer to
determine that asbestos was the probable cause of the plaintiff's cancer. Id.
103. The court pointed to Grassis v. Johns-Manville Corp., 591 A.2d 671 (N.J. Super.
1991). Id. The plaintiff sued to recover for alleged colon cancer as a result of a fifteen (15)
year exposure to asbestos dust while employed by the defendant. Grassis, 591 A.2d at 672-
73. The trial judge prohibited the plaintiff's doctor from testifying because she relied on
epidemiological studies that had a causative incidence rate below 2.0. Id. at 674-75. The
appellate court reversed and stated that if an epidemiological study is not introduced as direct
evidence of causation, it can be used and explained by a qualified expert even if it does not
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trial court's threshold level of two (2.0) for a relative risk factor in deciding
to accept epidemiological evidence as proof of causation.
10 4
On remand, 0 the district court again discussed epidemiological evi-
dence at length. 0 6 It considered the Grassis requirement'0 7 and other interpre-
tations of that holding.'08 In order to determine if the plaintiff's evidence was
actually sufficient to withstand summary judgment, the court considered five
additional factors beyond the relative risk ratio: 0 9
1) The consistency of the association between the substance and the
disease (to be determined by comparing the particular study offered in evi-
dence with other studies);
2) The dose-response relationship between the substance and the disease
(to'be determined by approximating the incidence of disease in a population
if they were exposed to various levels of the substance);
3) The results of experimental studies"0 (to be determined by compar-
ing the offered results with the results from actual experiments conducted with
animals);
4) The plausibility of a biological link between the substance and the
disease (to be determined by the probability that the disease could occur due
to known biological and chemical structures); and
5) The coherence between the substance and the disease (to be deter-
mined by how many other factors could have contributed to the development
of the disease in the plaintiff).'
After applying these "Sufficiency Criteria"' 12 to the plaintiff's evidence,
conclude the risk factor to be 2.0 or greater. Id. at 676. A higher standard of admissibility
for such studies should be required only if it is offered as substantive evidence. Id.
104. In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 964 F.2d at 97.
105. In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 827 F. Supp. 1014
(S.D.N.Y. 1993).
106. Id. at 1027-38.
107. Id. at 1028-29. See supra note 103.
108. Id. Determining the need for a higher standard of scientific evidence if the only
clinical evidence was the elimination of other potential factors. See Landrigan v. Celotex
Corp., 605 A.2d 1079 (N.J. 1992); Dafler v. Raymark Indus., Inc. 611 A.2d 136 (N.J. Super.
1992), aff'd, 622 A.2d 1223 (N.J. 1992).
109. Throughout the opinion, the court continued to discuss the relative risk ratio (later
termed the SMR or Standardized Mortality Ratio), even though the Appeals Court had not
taken issue on that point. See generally In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos
Litigation, 827 F. Supp. 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
110. See supra note 90 (regarding the different types of epidemiological studies that may
be undertaken by scientists).
111. In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 827 F. Supp. at 1037-38.
112. Id. at 1037. The court defined the five elements to be collectively referred to as the
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the court found that only the plausibility element was satisfied." 3 Therefore,
all of the defendants' motions for judgment as a matter of law "' were
granted."
5
The Use of Market Share Theory - Liability Relaxation Too?
Along with the proof of causation, a theory of liability must be ex-
pounded that will ultimately hold only culpable parties liable. In recognition
of this principle, the Florida statute provides for the use of market share
method of apportioning liability." 6 The term "market share"" 17 has been open
to ambiguity and interpretation. As a result, the basic theory has evolved
through judicial interpretation." 8 The market share theory is a judicially
created exception to basic tort principles because it relieves the plaintiff of the
requirement of identifying a single tort-feasor, and shifts to the defendant the
burden of proving that the injury was not caused by its product." 9 The theory
gained a legal foothold in the pharmaceutical arena with cases that involved
diethylstilbestrol (DES).
DES, a prescription drug to help prevent the possibility of a miscarriage
"Sufficiency Criteria". Id.
113. Id. at 1038. The final outcome is arrived at based on the number of the "Sufficiency
Criteria" met by the offered evidence. Id. Evidence that is deemed sufficient will meet the
majority of the criteria. Id. If the evidence does not meet any of the criteria, it should not be
relied upon to support a jury verdict for the plaintiff. Id.
114. FED. R. CIV. P. 50(b). This rule allows the court to let the jury verdict stand, reopen
the judgment and order a new trial, or direct the entry of a judgment as a matter of law. The
standard for the last determination is FED. R. Civ. P. 50(a)(1), which states:
If during a trial by jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and there is no legally
sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find for that party on that issue, the
court may "determine the issue against that party and may" grant a motion for judgment
as a matter of law against that party "with respect to a" claim, or a defense that cannot
under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a favorable finding on
that issue.
115. In re Joint Eastern and Southern District Asbestos Litigation, 827 F. Supp. at 1038.
116. 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 94-251, § 4(b), Fla. Stat. ch. 409-910 (West 1994).
117. "Market share" is defined as the percentage of the total sales in a given market that is
controlled by a given firm. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 971 (6th ed. 1990).
118. See Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 485 (Cal. 1988) (requiring a substantial
share of the manufacturers to be joined in the action); Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 570 So. 2d
275, 284 (Fla. 1990) (requiring a narrow market definition); George v. Parke-Davis, 733
P.2d 507, 512 (Wash. 1987) (market share should be determined on a local level versus a
national level); Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 689 P.2d 368, 382 (Wash. 1984) (allowing
exculpatory defenses if defendant did not produce particular product or did not participate in
the relevant market).
119. Goldman v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 514 N.E.2d 691, 693 (Ohio 1987).
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during pregnancy, was marketed from 1941 to 197 1.120 The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) cautiously authorized this particular use and allowed
the drug to be marketed as a miscarriage preventer. 121 The prescribed DES
was manufactured by numerous companies to a generic formula that was filed
in the United States Pharmacopoeia.1 22 It was also typically administered in
a generic dosage. 123 However, the FDA revoked the marketing license in
1971124 and DES could no longer be promoted as a treatment for the preven-
tion of miscarriages.
Market Share Theory Origination
The market share theory was judicially developed in the landmark case
of Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories.25 In Sindell, the plaintiff developed
adenocarcinoma (a form of cancer) due to the DES her mother ingested while
she was in uetero. 12 6 She was unable to identify the specific manufacturer of
the DES taken by her mother. 127 The Supreme Court of California held
manufacturers of a drug made from an identical formula would be liable if the
plaintiff successfully joined a substantial share of the drug manufacturers in
the relevant market. 128 The defendants must then accept the burden of excul-
pating themselves in order to escape liability.'29 If a defendant is unable to
prove it could not have caused the harm to the particular plaintiff, the com-
pany is then responsible for the proportion of the judgment that is represented
by its share of the market. 3 °
In adopting the market share theory, the court considered but rejected
three other tort recovery theories. The alternative liability theory'3' was
120. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 925 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
912 (1980).
121. Id.
122. Id. at 933. The listing is a scientific constant and all manufacturers are required to use
the formulas pursuant to 21 U.S.C.A. § 35 1(b). Id.
123. Id. at 926.
124. Id. at 925.
125. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980). In its decision, the
California Supreme Court relied heavily upon a law review comment that advocated for a new
remedy to be fashioned for the unique nature of the DES claims. See Naomi Sheiner, DES
and A Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963 (1978).
126. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 926.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 937.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948)(The plaintiff had been shot and either
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rejected because it required that all potential tort-feasors be named as defen-
dants.' 32 This was not feasible in the DES cases due to the large number of
manufacturers.' The court also rejected the concert of action theory.'34 The
theory could not be advanced because it required four factual findings: the
failure of an industry to properly test a product; the failure to issue sufficient
warnings; reliance of the manufacturer on testing data compiled by external
sources; and "piggybacking" on other companies marketing techniques.'35
DES manufacturers did not fit these categories. 3 6 Finally, the court rejected
the enterprise theory.'37 This theory did not apply because of the large num-
one of two hunters could equally have caused the injury. Both hunters had negligently fired
in the direction of the plaintiff. The California Supreme Court felt justified in shifting the
burden of proof to the each of the defendants since each one would be in a better position to
prove he did not cause the injury. Alternative liability shifts the burden of proving causation
from an innocent plaintiff to equally liable defendants.).
132. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 931.
133. Id. at 930-31. The Sindell opinion estimated the number of manufacturers at around
200. Id. However, a more detailed analysis places the number of manufacturers between 94
and 300 because some producers did not market DES for miscarriage prevention. See Sheiner,
supra note 125, at 964 n.3.
134. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 932. Prosser explains the concerted action theory as a "joint tort"
that imposed vicarious liability on all parties involved due to the intentional actions that
furthered the tortious act. See PROSSER, supra note 32, at 291-93.
135. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 932.
136. Id. at 933.
137. Id. at 935. The court stated that the enterprise theory was broadly defined so that any
enterprise would be responsible for all of the injuries and damages caused by that particular
entity. Id. at 928 n.9, citing Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47
U. COLO. L. REV. 153, 158 (1976). Because this theory might be used when plaintiffs cannot
identify the cause of their injury, seven elements must be proven to shift the burden of proof
to defendants:
1) It is not the plaintiff's fault for the inability to identify the cause of the injury and
liability is due to the nature of the defendant's conduct;
2) A defective generic product was made by all defendants;
3) The injury was cause by this product defect;
4) A duty was owed to the plaintiff's class;
5) Clear and convincing evidence exists that shows the injury was a result of a
product made by one of the defendants, such as a high percentage of the market is
represented by the joined defendants;
6) No industry wide safety standard existed for the manufacture of the defective
product; and
7) All defendants were tort-feasors that satisfy the requirements of the proposed
cause of action (negligence, warranty, or strict liability).
Sheiner, supra note 125, at 995. See also Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345
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ber of DES producers and because safety testing had not been delegated to a
trade association.1
38
In Brown v. Superior Court, 39 the California court refined their original
pronouncement of the Sindell market share theory. Brown held that a market
share approach was not available in an action brought under theories of
fraud 4° or breach of warranty 4' in California. 42 The court stated that while
it did not address the issue of joint and several liability in Sindell, omission
of such a discussion should not have been interpreted to have actually imposed
joint and several liability.'43 The Brown court held that a defendant would be
only severally liable because joint liability would be inconsistent with the
goals of the market share theory."'
The Florida Viewpoint
The leading case in Florida on the market share approach is Conley v.
Boyle Drug Company. "I In Conley, the plaintiff filed suit against eleven
manufacturers and marketers of DES'4 6 on theories of negligence, strict liabil-
ity, breach of warranty, and fraud.'4 7 Because the plaintiff could not identify
F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
138. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 935.
139. 751 P.2d 470 (Cal. 1988).
140. In order to prosecute a claim of fraud, the plaintiff must show that the defendant
made misrepresentations upon which the plaintiff detrimentally relied and that the
misrepresentations were either intentionally made or made with fraudulent knowledge. Id. at
483-84.
141. Express warranty has two elements: a seller must conform to any promises made
concerning his product and the plaintiff must detrimentally rely on those express promises.
Id. at 484. Implied warranty arises because the product is assumed to be fit for ordinary
purposes or intended use. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 485.
144. Id. at 486. The court restated its reasoning for the adoption of the market share
theory in Sindell, but clarified that if joint liability were imposed, the defendants would not
be charged with the proportionate responsibility correlated to the probability that they caused
the plaintiff's injury. Id.
145. 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990).
146. Conley v. Boyle Drug Co., 477 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 4 Dist. Ct. App. 1985), decision
quashed, 570 So. 2d 275 (Fla. 1990). The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the case saying that they did not feel justified in accepting a relaxed causation requirement,
but it did certify the following question to the Supreme Court: "Does Florida Recognize A
Cause Of Action Against A Defendant For Marketing Defective DES When The Plaintiff
Admittedly Cannot Establish That A Particular Defendant Was Responsible For The Injury?"
Conley, 570 So. 2d at 278. Id. at 607 (emphasis omitted).
147. Conley, 570 So. 2d at 279.
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the specific DES manufacturer that caused her particular injury,'48 she pleaded
for reduced causation and identification requirements through the adoption of
alternative liability, concert of action, enterprise liability, or a market share
theory of liability.'49
In an opinion that showed a reluctance to relax causation principles, the
court stated that "[m]arket share liability is generally looked upon as a theory
of last resort', developed to provide a remedy where there is an inherent in-
ability to identify the manufacturer of the product that caused the injury."
50
Therefore, if a plaintiff is able to identify the specific tort-feasor that caused
the injury and traditional remedies are available, there is no reason to resort
to a risk contribution remedy.' 5 ' The court added a due diligence requirement
to the existing body of market share standards. 52 This forces plaintiffs to
reasonably attempt to identify and locate the manufacturer responsible for the
injury."' The Florida court followed Brown by limiting the use of the theory
to negligence actions and prohibiting the use when allegations of fraud,
breach of warranty, or strict liability are made.
5 4
The Conley decision narrowed the application of the market share theory
by applying geographic restrictions, limiting the time frame to only the inges-
tion period of the specific plaintiff, and only joining in the manufacturers of
the type of DES used by the plaintiff's mother.'55 The defendant manufacturer
could exculpate itself only by showing that it neither marketed nor distributed
DES during the period of the particular plaintiff's DES exposure. 56 All
remaining defendants were presumed to have equal market shares unless a
specific actual share was demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence.1
57
The other defendants' shares were then inflated to ensure that one hundred
percent (100%) of the relevant market was accounted for.
58
148. A number of factors contributed to the plaintiffs' identification problem in the DES
cases: the drug was generic in nature, there were a large number of producers, permanent
prescription and pharmacy records were scarce, and the long latency period. See Lee Gunn &
J. Meredith Webster, Florida's Adoption of the Market-Share Products Liability Theory -
Drugs and Beyond 65 FLA. B. J. 37 (March 1991).
149. Conley, 570 So. 2d at 279.
150. Id. at 285 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533, 537 (Fla. 1985).
151. Id. at 286.
152. Id. at 285.
153. Id.
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The court rejected the defendants' due process, equal protection, and
access to courts' challenges because a defendant was not precluded from
presenting a defense, nor was liability imposed in an arbitrary manner.'59 The
plaintiff still had a significant burden to prove that the defendant acted
tortiously. 16 ° Also, each defendant could be exonerated if it could establish
the inability to have caused the plaintiff's injury. 161
Prior to Conley, the Florida court had the opportunity to consider the
application of the market share theory of liability for use in the asbestos-re-
lated injury case of Celotex Corp. v. Copeland.162 In Celotex, the court found
that the plaintiff developed asbestosis from exposure to various asbestos prod-
ucts during his thirty-three year career as a boilermaker. 163 Sixteen defendants
were named in the original complaint and the plaintiff urged the court to adopt
the market share theory as announced in Sindell.
164
The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Florida district court of
appeal 165 and rejected the use of market share theory in the case.' 66 Two fac-
tors contributed to its decision: the ability of the plaintiff to identify eleven
of the defendants as suppliers of products to which he was specifically ex-
posed, and the unique characteristics that distinguished asbestos from DES .
167
The court was able to avoid the ultimate question of overall acceptance or
rejection of the theory in Florida because the case did not justify a major
policy shift in the state's product liability law.
68
159. Id. at 287.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985).
163. Id. at 534.
164. Id. at 534-35.
165. Copeland v. Celotex Corp., 447 So. 2d 908 (Fla. 3 Dist. Ct. App. 1984), decision
quashed, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985). The district court of appeal had reversed the judgment
of the trial court and approved the use of the market share theory in asbestos litigation. Id. at
916. However, the court certified the question to the Supreme Court inquiring if the Sindell
market share theory should be adopted in Florida. Celotex, 471 So. 2d at 534. Id. at 916 n.8.
166. Celotex, 471 So. 2d at 539. The court agreed with the appeals court dissent that the
theory should not apply whenever a plaintiff is able to identify at least one manufacturer who
caused his injury. Id. at 537.
167. Id. at 537-38. The main asbestos trait that influenced the court was the divergent
toxicity of products. Id. at 538. The geographic origin, the usable form, and the percentage
used in a product can each dramatically influence the ability of the particular product to
cause harm or disease. Id. These traits are in contrast to the common formula of DES and
the consistent toxicity due to the steady dosage ingested by the pregnant women. See supra
pp. 22-23.
168. Id. at 539.
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In Ohio, the market share theory was considered in Goldman v. Johns-
Manville Sales Corp. 169 The case was an asbestos liability action brought by
a bakery employee who had allegedly developed cancer due to contact with
products containing asbestos.170 The plaintiff advanced both the alternative
and market share liability theories. 17 1 The Common Pleas Court of Lucas
County refused to acknowledge either theory, and granted summary judgment
for the defendants.' The Lucas County Court of Appeals reversed, held that
both theories were applicable, and recognized the market share theory.'
7 3
However, the Supreme Court held that neither theory, especially market share,
would apply in asbestos litigation in the State of Ohio. 74 The Court could
conceive of no problem in greater need of a legislative solution.1
7
1
A market share theory can only be used in Ohio when an alternative
theory fails to apply. 76 The first criteria for applying a market share theory
is fungibility of the products that could have caused the harm. 77 The court
differentiated between the DES involved in the Sindell case and asbestos.
78
169. 514 N.E.2d 691 (Ohio 1987). See also Tirey v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513
N.E.2d 825 (Montgomery County, C. P. 1986).
170. Goldman, 514 N.E.2d at 692. The court stated that the plaintiff was unable to pinpoint
the specific product or the specific manufacturer that may have caused his cancer. Id. at 693.
This finding ultimately led to the reversal because the plaintiff failed to establish through the
evidence the identity of any manufacturer that supplied products to his employer. Id. at 699.
See also Thompson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 714 F.2d 581 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1102 (1984) (rejecting both alternative and market share theories when plaintiff
unable to identify all defendants that supplied asbestos products to his employer).
171. Goldman, 514 N.E.2d at 692. The Ohio standard for alternative liability was announced
in Minnich v. Ashland Oil Co., 473 N.E.2d 1199 (Ohio 1984). The court stated that a plaintiff
in the State of Ohio must still prove that two or more defendants committed tortious acts and
that he was injured as a proximate result of those acts. Id. at 1200.
172. Goldman, 514 N.E.2d at 692.
173. Id. at 693.
174. Id. at 701-02.
175. Id. at 701. The court found the language used by the Iowa Supreme Court in Mulcahy
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986) persuasive. The Iowa court rejected the
market share theory on a broad policy basis because it felt that a judicially imposed acceptance
would be "social engineering" that was more appropriately the responsibility of the state
legislature. Goldman, 514 N.E.2d at 701-02.
176. Goldman, 514 N.E.2d at 693 n.3.
177. Id. at 700.
178. Id. The court stated that DES was manufactured by numerous companies, but all of
the firms used a single formula. Id. Because of the single formulation, there was no bias or
unfairness for holding companies liable for their share of the market. See supra note 122.
Asbestos, on the other hand, was a generic name for a family of minerals that differed widely
based upon type of the product it was used as a component in. Goldman, 514 N.E.2d at 700.
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The criteria of fungibility was enough to reject market share in this case.'79
Another requirement appears to be the ability to name the largest sup-
plier of the harmful product within the relevant market.180 The court cited
Hannon v. Waterman S.S. Corp."8 ' for the proposotion that it would be
desirable to name the "main actor in the marketplace" in order to achieve the
substantial share requirement used in Sindell.8 2 The court felt that a market
share theory should be used in cases involving fewer complexities than
asbestos litigation. 83 Therefore, the market share theory is still not viable in
Ohio asbestos litigation.
18 4
PART III: TOBACCO'S SMOKY HISTORY
The First Wave
Five early cases formed the initial attack on cigarette manufacturers.
85
In Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 86 the plaintiff 87brought suit
on the theories of negligence and breach of express warranty.'88 During pros-
ecution of the warranty claim, the plaintiff alleged that-he smoked Chester-
field cigarettes manufactured by Liggett & Myers because of the advertising
that proclaimed the safety of the product. 89 The company had placed numer-
179. Goldman, 514 N.E.2d at 701.
180. Id. at 701.
181. 567 F. Supp. 90 (E.D. La. 1983) (an asbestos case rejecting the application of market
share theory to such cases).
182. Goldman, 514 N.E.2d at 701.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 702.
185. See Cooper v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 234 F.2d 170 (1st Cir. 1956) (fraudulent
advertising); Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961)
(negligence and breach of express warranty); Green v. American Tobacco Co., 304 F.2d 70
(5th Cir. 1962) (breach of implied warranty of fitness for use under Florida law), certified
question answered, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), answer to certified question conformed to,
325 F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964); Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963) (breach of implied warranty and negligence), cert.
denied 375 U.S. 865 (1963); Ross v. Phillip Morris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (breach
of implied warranty, negligence, fraud and deceit by false advertising).
186. 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
187. Mr. Pritchard's suffering from lung cancer was extensive. He had lost over fifty
pounds of body weight, experienced recurring vomiting and hemorrhaging, suffered an
inability to swallow, and continual shortness of breath. Pritchard, 295 F.2d at 299.
188. Id. at 294.
189. Id. at 296-97. The following is an example of the advertising that was used to promote
the Chesterfield brand: "The constant quality tests and advanced research in Chesterfield's
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ous ads in magazines such as Time and Life, advertised in the daily newspa-
per read by Mr. Pritchard, and enlisted a trusted spokesperson.' 90
On his negligence claim, the plaintiff attempted to prove that the com-
pany had performed adequate testing to show the link between cigarette
smoking and cancer. 19' The jury returned a finding that Mr. Pritchard's
consumption of Chesterfield cigarettes were a cause of his lung cancer.
92
However, the jury also found that assumption of risk barred the plaintiff from
being awarded any compensation. 193
The appeals court found that the questions of causation, the reasonable-
ness of conducting more tests, and the reasonableness of the plaintiff's reli-
ance on the advertisements should all have been submitted to the jury.' 94 A
new trial was awarded to the plaintiff because of the prejudicial and funda-
mental mistake of misstatement of the law in the instructions given by the trial
court.' 95 In order for the jury to find assumption of risk, the plaintiff would
modern laboratories are your guarantee that Chesterfields will always be much milder - the
best cigarette for you to smoke." Id. at 297.
190. Id. The newspaper advertisements ran for a period of two consecutive years. Id. The
cigarette brand was advertised by Arthur Godfrey on his highly regarded radio show. Id. His
statements were explicit and were meant to be very convincing to the general public:
That they mean what they say-that specialist said it, Liggett and Myers have
substantiated it. Remember that when you're wondering about cigarettes. Smoke
Chesterfields - they're good. Thank you. Id.
Another radio ad continued:
You hear stuff all the time about 'cigarettes are harmful to you' this and that and the
other thing .... Here's an ad, you've seen it in the papers-please read it when you
get it. If you smoke it will make you feel better, really. Nose, throat, and accessory
organs not adversely affected by smoking Chesterfield. Id.
The court noted that it believed "the clear import of this advertising campaign was to lead
smokers to believe that in order to 'Play Safe- Smoke Chesterfield."' Id.
191. Id. at 300. It was shown that Liggett & Myers had commissioned a separate firm to
test the hazards associated with their product. Id. The results of the test were inconclusive at
best and a reviewing doctor noted that many test participants experienced harmful effects as
a result of smoking Chesterfields. Id. The company disregarded this information and
concluded that its product did not harm the nose, throat, or other organs and proceeded to use
this information in the advertising campaign. Id. See supra note 190.
192. Pritchard v. Liggett & Meyers Tobacco Co., 350 F.2d 479, 482 (3d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 987 (1966), modified, 370 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1009 (1967) (appeal from the remanded trial from 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961)).
193. Id. In all of the early cigarette litigation, the tobacco companies asserted the defenses
of assumption of risk or contributory negligence. See Leila B. Boulton, Tobacco Under Fire:
Developments in Judicial Responses to Cigarette Smoking Injuries, 36 CATH. U. L. REV.
643, 647 (1987).
194. 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
195. 350 F.2d at 486.
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have had to have known the dangers of smoking and voluntarily exposed
himself to the harm.1 96 The court was not convinced of this fact by a review
of the evidentiary record. 97
In Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,1 98 the plaintiff had smoked at
least two packs of cigarettes a day for fifty-five years.' 99 His claim urged the
court to hold the manufacturer absolutely liable under a claim of implied
warranty. 20 0 The court stated that the safety standard for products and warn-
ings is the same under both theories of implied warranty and negligence.
20
1
Under this standard, a manufacturer would only be required to insure against
foreseeable risks, and would not be held strictly liable for all harm caused by
its products. 20 2 In this case, the defendant was found not to have been aware
of "the harmful effects which no developed human skill or foresight can af-
ford. 203
The plaintiff in Ross v. Philip Morris & Co.20 4 also asserted a claim based
upon breach of implied warranty. 20 5 Philip Morris advanced the defenses of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence. 20 6 Evidence of a general
196. Id. at 485.
197. Id. The court could not believe that Liggett & Myers was not aware of the health
hazards, while at the same time presenting a defense that required Mr. Pritchard to be
completely knowledgeable and continue using an inherently dangerous product. Id.
198. 317 F.2d 19 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963).
199. Id. at 22. Mr. Lartigue had a long history of diseases in his medical background.
However, his advanced stage cancer required the removal of his larynx and most of his vocal
cords in 1954. Id. He died of lung cancer one year later. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 37 (quoting 2 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, §
28.22, at 1584 (1961)). See Tierstein v. Licht, 345 P.2d 341 (Cal. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959)
(stating that the standard is reasonable care).
202. Lartigue, 317 F.2d at 36. Injuries that occur as a result of foreseeable risks are
considered a cost of doing business and the manufacturer should build these expenses into
the cost of the product. Id.
203. Id. at 23 (quoting the jury instructions of the trial judge). An explanation was given
by the court that people who smoked before it was discovered that a possible link existed
between cigarette smoking and cancer could not rely on a tobacco company "warranty" that
cigarettes did not contain any carcinogenic element. Id. at 39-40.
204. 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
205. Id. at 5. The plaintiff dropped the fraud and deceit issue on appeal and also decided
not to pursue the issue of negligence either. Id. The only claim that remained for consideration
was implied warranty. Id.
206. Id. The plaintiff had smoked up to four packs per day of Philip Morris cigarettes
exclusively for eighteen years. Id. He also drank heavily at various times throughout his life
(this fact contributed to the debate over the cause in fact of the cancer). Id. Mr. Ross
developed throat cancer and had to have a neck dissection and tracheotomy. Id. This operation
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causal relationship between cancer and smoking was presented by the plain-
tiff.20 7 However, the court found this evidence inapplicable because no at-
tempt was made to show that the defendant's product did not comply with the
standards of the industry.2 °8
This court also determined that reasonableness was the standard to be
used in Missouri for claims of implied warranty. 20 9 Accordingly, the court
held that the defendant was only liable for known dangers associated with the
product. 210 This liability standard provided an incentive for tobacco compa-
nies to fully research the harmful effects of their products, and shifted the
burden of proving the foreseeability of harm to the defendant, who must prove
that nobody could have foreseen the danger.,' Judgment was entered for the
defendant.
212
The case of Green v. American Tobacco Co.21 3 came the closest to a
plaintiff victory during this first wave of cases.214 The jury at the first trial
found that the Lucky Strike cigarettes made by the defendant caused the
plaintiff's cancer, but refused to hold American Tobacco Company liable
because it could not foresee the harmful effects.21 5 This resulted in a certified
question being submitted to the Florida Supreme Court 216 which held that a
207. Id. at 9-10.
208. Id. Without asserting that the cigarettes lacked an essential element or contained
some type of foreign substance, the court was unwilling to find that the defendant produced a
defective product in light of the knowledge that existed prior to 1952. Id. at 8.
209. Id. at 10. See Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963) (en
banc) (case determining reasonableness standard relied upon by the 8th Circuit). The federal
court had diversity jurisdiction over the claim and therefore had to determine questions of
law as though the Missouri Supreme Court was issuing the decision. Ross, 328 F.2d at 7.
210. Id. at 13-14.
211. Id. at 12-13. The court felt that this was a significant burden to place upon defendants
and would provide a substantial incentive to warn consumers if a harmful effect was actually
determined to exist. Id.
212. Id. at 16.
213. 304 F.2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962) (breach of implied warranty of fitness for use under
Florida law), certified question answered, 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963), conformed to, 325
F.2d 673 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 943 (1964).
214. Boulton, supra note 193, at 648-49.
215. Green, 304 F.2d at 71-72.
216. 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963). The following question was certified:
Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer and distributor of cigarettes
absolute liability, as for breach of implied warranty, for death caused by using such
cigarettes from 1924 or 1925 until February 1, 1956, the cancer having developed
prior to February 1, 1956, and the death occurring February 25, 1958, when the
defendant manufacturer and distributor could not on, or prior to, February 1, 1956,
by the reasonable application of human skill and foresight, have known that users of
such cigarettes would be endangered, by the inhalation of the main stream smoke
from such cigarettes, of contracting cancer of the lung?
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manufacturer's knowledge of harm is irrelevant in an action of implied war-
ranty of fitness. 17
In the second trial, the jury again decided in favor of the defendant but
the Fifth Circuit again reversed.2 18 The court held that Mr. Green could rely
on an implied warranty that cigarettes were fit for their intended purpose.219
A rehearing was held en banc and the Fifth Circuit overruled its earlier deci-
sion. 220 This time, the court was influenced by the comments of the dissent-
ing judge's opinion in the second appeal 22' and held that cigarettes were not
defective even though a large percentage of users could develop cancer. 222
The Federal Legislative Response
In response to the above mentioned cases and to a 1964 Surgeon
General's report 223 that concluded that "cigarette smoking is a health hazard
of sufficient importance in the United States to warrant remedial action, ' 224
Congress passed the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act.225 This
Id. at 170.
217. Id. at 170-71. The court cited its earlier decision in Carter v. Hector Supply, 128 So.
2d 390 (Fla. 1961) that expressly negated any knowledge requirement on the part of a
manufacturer or distributor. Green, 304 F.2d at 71.
218. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97, 101 (5th Cir. 1968), overruled by, 409
F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970).
219. Id. at 106.
220. Green v. American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (1969) (en bane), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 911 (1970).
221. See generally Green, 391 F.2d at 106-13 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
222. Green, 409 F.2d at 1167 (Coleman, J., dissenting). The judge argued that cigarettes
must be a defective product because they have been known to have killed millions of people.
Id.
223. See Shaukat Karjeker, Federal Preemption of Cigarette Products Liability Claims
Creates a Need for Congressional Action, 6 REV. LITIG. 339, 342 (1987), citing U.S. DEPT.
OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE, SMOKING AND HEALTH, REPORT OF THE ADVISORY
COMMITTEE TO THE SURGEON GENERAL OF THE PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES (1964).
224. Id.
225. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 2, 79 Stat. 282
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-40 (1984)). Section 1331 states:
It is the policy of the Congress, and the purpose of this chapter, to establish a
comprehensive Federal program to deal with cigarette labeling and advertising with
respect to any relationship between smoking and health, whereby-(1) the public
may be adequately informed about any adverse health effects of cigarette smoking
by inclusion of warning notices on each package of cigarettes and in each
advertisement of cigarettes; and (2) commerce and the national economy may be (A)
protected to the maximum extent consistent with this declared policy and (B) not
impeded by diverse, non-uniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising
regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health.
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Act had two purposes: the first was to provide consistent regulation of label-
ing and advertising of tobacco products throughout the states, and the second
was to inform the public of the health risks associated with smoking.226 These
two purposes seemed to be in conflict and required Congress to balance the
objectives of protecting the national economy and protecting the public
health.
227
The Act required that a specified warning be placed on every package
of cigarettes. 2  However, the warning became stronger in 1970 when the Act
was amended for the first time. 2 9 In the Act's last amendment in 1984, Con-
gress mandated that four warnings pertaining to cancer causation, reduction
of health risks, pregnancy complications, and carbon monoxide in cigarette
smoke be placed on cigarette packs on a rotational basis.
230
The Act was preemptive in nature.2 1' The express preemption prohibited
226. 15 U.S.C. § 1331 (1993). See Christopher J. Gagin, Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.:
A Preemptive Lucky Strike?, 26 AKRON L. REV. 311, 312 (1992); Lee Gordon and Carol A.
Granoff, A Plaintiff's Guide to Reaching Tobacco Manufacturers: How to Get the Cigarette
Industry Off It's Butt, 22 SETON HALL L. REV. 851, 861 (1992).
227. See Karjeker, supra note 223, at 345. The author notes that Congress recognized the
importance of the tobacco industry to the national economy. Id. The Act was to provide a
shield for the industry from the expected onslaught of legislation from various states. Id.
228. Id. The original warning that was mandated to appear on all cigarette packs was
"Caution: Cigarette Smoking May Be Hazardous to Your Health." Id.
229. Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, § 2, 84 Stat. 88
91970), amended by Act of Oct. 12, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-474, §4, 98 Stat. 2201 (1984). The
new warning stated "Warning. The Surgeon General Has Determined That Smoking is
Dangerous to Your Health." Id.
230. Karjeker, supra note 223, at 345-46. Four specific warnings are now mandated. The
statements are:
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking Causes Lung Cancer, Heart Disease,
Emphysema, And May Complicate Pregnancy.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Quitting Smoking Now Greatly Reduces Serious
Risks to Your Health.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Smoking By Pregnant Women May Result in Fetal
Injury, Premature Birth, And Low Birth Weight.
SURGEON GENERAL'S WARNING: Cigarette Smoke Contains Carbon Monoxide
15 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (1993).
The Act regulates the appearance of these warnings on cigarette packs (Subsec. A(I));
on all advertising media (Subsec. A(2)); and on outdoor billboards (Subsec. A(3)). Subsection
B states the visual requirements by dictating the size of lettering, the contrasting type or
background, and the relative location on the item. Subsection C requires that the four mandated
warnings appear on a quarterly rotational basis. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1333 (1993).
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the States from imposing any further requirements if the cigarette packages
complied with the federal mandate. 232 However, the original Act 233 and its
amendments 234 did not address the availability of common law tort actions to
plaintiffs who were harmed from their use of tobacco products.
The Second Judicial Wave
There are two major cases that symbolize the second attack on cigarette
manufacturers. In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.,235 the plaintiff brought
suit based on theories of negligence, strict liability, and breach of express
warranty.236 Even though the suit was intended to compensate Rose Cipollone
for the injuries she suffered as a result of smoking cigarettes, 237 the various
court decisions focused upon the Labeling Act's preemption provisions.
2 38
The trial court defined the issue of Cipollone in terms of the ability of a
plaintiff to bring a claim under state tort laws when cigarette manufacturers
"This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof .... shall be the supreme Law of the Land;..." U.S. CONST. art.
VI, § 2.
See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525-26 (1977) (stating that Congressional acts
will override state laws if the two are in conflict). See also Roysdon v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 849 F.2d 230-34 (6th Cir. 1988) (state law claim for failure to warn conflicts
with Act and is therefore preempted); Stephen v. American Brands, Inc., 825 F.2d 312, 313
(11 th Cir. 1987) (denial of motion to strike defense of preemption under a claim of inadequate
warning of dangers); Gunsalus v. Celotex Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1149, 1159 (E.D. Pa. 1987)
(holding that claims for manufacture and sale of defective tobacco products before effective
date of Act were not preempted).
232. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1334, entitled "Preemption", states:
(a) No statement relating to smoking and health, other than the statement required
by [section 1333 of this title], shall be required on any cigarette package.
(b) No requirement or prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed
under State law with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the
packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this [chapter].
233. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No. 89-92, § 5, 79 Stat. 283
(1965).
234. See Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 88
(1970) (now codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1333(b)(1993)).
235. 593 F. Supp. 1146, (D.N.J. 1984), rev'd, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986).
236. Id. at 1149.
237. Rose Cipollone contracted lung cancer. Id. She and her husband originally filed suit
against three cigarette manufacturers. Id. However, during the course of the first trial Mrs.
Cipollone died as a result of her cancer. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 183
(3d Cir. 1986). Her husband pursued the claim individually and as administrator of her
estate. Id.
238. See Gagin, supra note 226, at 311-12.
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have complied with the federally mandated warning.23 9 The defendant argued
that common law tort claims had a regulatory effect and were therefore barred
as a result of the preemption.240 The court was not persuaded by this argument
and stated that tort law is only a motivator to refrain from acting due to the
potential liability. 24' The court held that claims of inadequate warning were
not barred by the Act because the Act is not conclusive proof of the adequacy
of the warning.242 Plaintiffs should be able to attempt to prove the inadequacy
of the warning.
243
However, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals reversed because the rul-
ing would interfere with the objective and purpose of the Labeling Act.244 The
reversal was based upon two holdings: the district court should not have
decided the issue of preemption if an actual conflict did not exist between the
state and federal statutes 245 and secondly, the district court should not have
removed the preemption defense because such a decision was not supported
by the facts in the record. 46 The court did not feel obligated to answer the
appeal on the trial court's statement of the issue.247 Therefore, the Third
Circuit held that the Act preempts any state law claim that challenges the
adequacy of the warnings or actions with respect to advertising and promo-
239. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1148.
240. Id. at 1155.
241. Id. The finding of liability requires a choice by the defendant: he may make financial
payment of the award and decide to alter the product or face the potential for further liability
in other cases. Id. at 1156. Even though it could be argued that an adverse decision would
seem to suggest a change of behavior to a defendant, it is not a mandate and is therefore not
regulatory. Id.
242. Id. at 1148. The example discussed in the opinion concerns the pharmaceutical
industry. Id. at 1148-49. That industry is heavily regulated for purposes of safety and the
issuance of warnings of potentially harmful effects of the products. Id. However, the court
points out that drug companies have never been relieved of liability if a particular warning
was proved inadequate. Id. As discussed earlier, special recovery methods have been
developed in the pharmaceutical arena. See supra note 122.
243. Cipollone, 593 F. Supp. at 1148.
244. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187 (3d Cir. 1986).
245. Id. at 188. A court should not determine an issue if the litigants only present a
hypothetical situation. Id. The facts of the case must demonstrate the actual conflict. Id.
(citing Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659 (1982)).
246. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 188. A court must permit a defense unless "the insufficiency
of the defense is 'clearly apparent'." Id. See May Department Stores Co. v. First Hartford
Corp., 435 F. Supp. 849, 855 (D. Conn. 1977)(quoting CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1381, at 676 (1990)).
247. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 188. The opinion presented the text of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) in
a footnote. Id. at 188 n.8 (stating the procedural requirements of a certified question). The
court stated that they were free to decide the appeal and not be bound by the trial court's issue
statement. Id. at 188 n.9 (citing Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820 (3rd Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974)).
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tion of cigarettes.248 On remand, the district court determined that Cipollone's
claim based on warranty that was preempted.249
The other major case in the second wave of litigation was Palmer v.
Liggett Group, Inc.25 In Palmer, the plaintiff brought a claim of negligence
for inadequate warnings of the danger of the cigarette products her husband
had been using when he developed, and subsequently died from, lung can-
cer. 251 Once again, as in Cipollone, the main issue was preemption of state
common law tort actions by the federal Labeling Act.252 The district court
ruled that the claim was not preempted because of Congress' omission of an
express preemption provision.
2 5 3
The court cited numerous Congressional acts that eliminated common
law suits. 254 Even though the Act did not include a savings clause, 255 as had
been included in the Occupational Safety and Health Act,25 6 the court focused
on the omission due to the presumption against preemption. 257 The opinion
also contained an analysis of the potential inconsistent application of the Act
if manufacturers were found liable in one state and not in another.258 The
judge reasoned that if companies decided to place warnings on cigarette pack-
ages, above and beyond that required by the Act, no inconsistency existed.
2 59
248. Cipollone, 789 F.2d at 187.
249. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp 664, 675 (D.N.J. 1986), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 1043 (1987).
250. 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986), rev'd, 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
251. Id. at 1172. The plaintiff brought suit on her own behalf and as administratrix of her
late husband's estate. Id.
252. Id. at 1173.
253. Id. The court recognized that other jurisdictions had ruled in the opposite fashion. Id.
Compare Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 633 F. Supp. 1171 (D. Mass. 1986) with Roysdon v.
R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 623 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D. Tenn. 1985) (holding that exposure to
state law tort claims would interfere with Congress' intention of insuring uniform labeling
requirements), aff'd, 849 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1988).
254. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1174. The citations include the Domestic Housing and
International Recovery and Financial Stability Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1715z-17(d), 1715z-18(e);
the Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 301(a); and the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) & (c)(l). Id. See Jeffrey Trauberman, Compensating
Victims of Toxic Substances Pollution: An Analysis of Existing Federal Statutes, 5 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 1 (1981) (for a thorough discussion of federal statutes pertaining to all types
of toxic substances).
255. A savings clause is generally used in a statute to provide an exception of a special
thing from the general things mentioned in the statute. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1343 (6th
ed. 1990).
256. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(4) (declaring
that the Act does not preempt state workman's compensation laws).
257. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1175.
258. Id. at 1179.
259. Id. at 1177. The decision reasoned that nothing in 15 U.S.C. § 1333 prevented additional
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Common law liability did not equate to regulatory efforts by the states. 260
However, this decision was short lived because the First Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed. 26' The Court of Appeals also based its decision upon
principles of statutory construction. 262 The decision found the Labeling Act's
language to be straightforward and unambiguous.
263
The court's focus turned to the Act's desired goal of achieving a balance
between public health and the national economy.2 64 If state tort claims were
allowed to proceed, subjecting tobacco companies to liability, there would be
an excessive disruption of the balance that was achieved by the standards and
preemption promulgated in the Act. 265 The court held that "state law," as used
in the Labeling Act, included common law as well as statutory law.266 The
opinion rejected the district court's conclusion that a finding of liability was
not regulatory. 267 The First Circuit believed a liable manufacturer would be
compelled to revise its warnings and the real effect would be the same as
having state regulation of cigarette warnings.
2 68
In summary, Palmer and Cipollone determined that state common law
tort claims for inadequate warnings were preempted by the Labeling Act, and
generally ended the second wave of litigation.
269
PART IV: POTENTIAL DOWNPOUR ON FOREST FIRE
A Due Process Challenge?
The challenge to the new legislation will most likely be in the form of a
procedural due process claim. The term, "due process", originated in the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution when the amendment was rati-
warnings from appearing on packages - the Act only prevented states from requiring these
type of warnings through legislative means. Id.
260. Palmer, 633 F. Supp. at 1177.
261. Palmer v. Liggett Group, Inc., 825 F.2d 620 (1st Cir. 1987).
262. Id. at 623. The court discussed the rule of statutory construction which looks to a
statue's plain meaning. Id. The court commented that this case would be decided relying on
Congress' true intention. Id.
263. Id. at 626.
264. Id. Here again, the court found Congress' intention to be express because 15 U.S.C. §
1331 states the purpose of the Labeling Act. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 627.
267. Id. at 627-28.
268. Id. at 628.
269. Karjeker, supra note 223, at 344. The fact that two United States circuit courts agreed
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fied in 179 1.270 This clause applies only to the federal government. 27' Due
Process was applied to the states when the Fourteenth Amendment was added
to the Constitution in 1868.272 In addition to the federal Constitution, states
passed their own constitutions to govern how their citizens would be gov-
erned. Florida's Constitution contains a due process clause very similar to the
federal clauses. 273 The wording of Ohio's Constitution differs from the pre-
vious examples, 274 but has been interpreted to extend the same privileges to
the citizens of the state.
275
Due process has always been a vague term without precise definition.276
Without a clear and concise definition of due process, the elements of a chal-
lenge must begin with broad definitions. However, a number of United States
Supreme Court decisions have provided guidance on the substance of a due
process challenge. A corporation may institute such a suit because the Court
has stated that even though a corporation is not a "citizen" within the mean-
ing of the Privileges and Immunities Clause,27 7 it is a "person" within the
on the preemption issue and the United States Supreme Court denied certiori in Cipollone
seemed to damper many of the hopes of finding the tobacco companies liable for injuries that
resulted from the use of their products. Id.
270. U.S. CONST. amend. V states : "No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law;... " The United States Supreme Court has stated that
the idea of "due process of law" was derived from the phrase "by the law of the land", which
was found in the Magna Carta. See Den ex. dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement
Co., 59 U.S. 272, 276 (1855).
271. JETHRO K. LIEBERMAN, THE EVOLVING CONSTITUTION 169 (1992). The Supreme
Court has recognized the Fourteenth Amendement's terminology for the application of due
process to state law to mean the same as the language used in the Fifth Amendment's
application to federal law. See Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 100-1 (1908).
272. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states : "No state shall ... deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; ...."
273. FLA. CONST. art. I, § 9 states: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, or be compelled
in any criminal trial to be a witness against himself."
274. OHIO CONST. art. I, § 16 (Redress in courts) states:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done him in his land, goods,
person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, and shall have justice
administered without denial or delay. Suits may be brought against the state, in
such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law.
275. Mominee v. Scherbarth, No. L-84-171, 1985 WL 7071, at *16 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar.
22, 1985) (challenge to amended statute of limitations in medical malpractice case), aff'd,
503 N.E.2d 717 (Ohio 1986). The court held, "Ohio courts ... have interpreted 'due course
of law,' as being synonymous with 'due process of law.' Consequently, the requirements
under Ohio due process of law are essentially the same as those found in the United States
Constitution." Id.
276. See Lassiter v. Dept. of Social Services of Durham County, 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981).
277. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. ("The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
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meaning of the Equal Protection2 7 and Due Process Clauses. 279
In a case that originated in Ohio, but ended up in the United States
Supreme Court, the standard method for determining the validity of a state
statute is to first examine whether the law is contrary to fundamental prin-
ciples of liberty and justice.28 ° Another broad based interpretation is to deter-
mine if the legislation shocks a person's sense of fair play. 28 In an attempt
to narrow the definition, the Court announced three distinct factors to consider
in a due process challenge:
1) Determination of the extent that private interest will be affected by the
official action;
2) Determination of the risk of erroneous deprivation of such private
interest through procedures used and value of any additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and
3) Determine the government interests, including fiscal and administra-
tive burdens that would be incurred as a result of the additional procedures.
28 2
Due process has also been applied to the area concerning defenses. In
the early cases that challenged workers' compensation or employers' liabil-
ity laws, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the ability of a state to
reduce or eliminate certain defenses. In New York Central R. R. Co. v.
White,283 it was determined that a state legislature could alter, or even set aside
the common-law rules of negligence, assumption of risk, contributory negli-
gence, and fellow-servant doctrine if some reasonably just substitute was
provided.284 In the worker compensation statutory scheme, the defenses that
were abolished were substituted with a system that assured the employer of
limited liability.
285
A similar rule was delineated in 1919 when the Court held that states
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.").
278. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 also states: "No state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Since the 1954 case of Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, the concept of equal protection has applied to all federal, state, and
local governments of the United States. See LIEBERMAN, supra note 271, at 183.
279. Grosjean v. American Press Co., Inc., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
280. In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 334 (1957), aff'g 128 N.E.2d 106 (Ohio 1955).
281. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 (1954). The court upheld a decision of deportation
of an alien even though his act of joining the Communist Party was legal when done. Id. at
531. The dissent strongly criticized this as an application of an ex post facto law. Id. at 534.
(Douglas. J., dissenting).
282. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
283. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
284. Id. at 197-201.
285. Id. at 201.
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have a wide range of legislative discretion (within the bounds of the Four-
teenth Amendment) and the wisdom of the legislative acts are generally not
reviewable by the courts unless it appears the changes are arbitrary and unrea-
sonable. 286 For example, the Arizona legislature enacted an employer liabil-
ity law 28 7 that required compensation to be paid to any non-negligent
employee if the sustained injury was incurred as a result of his occupation.
2 88
In American Surety Co. v. Baldwin,28 9 the Court stated that due process
requires that there be an opportunity to present every available defense. 290 A
Florida court determined that a regulatory hearing that does not give the
defendant a right to present reasonable and legitimate defenses cannot be
considered a proper application of due process of law.
29 1
PART V: AN EVALUATION
At the initial thought of more tobacco litigation, the same questions of
causation come to mind as were presented in the Agent Orange litigation: 92
how can a litigant identify the defendant that caused the injury?; how can the
injury to the litigant be shown if only statistical and epidemiological evidence
show an increased incidence of disease due to exposure?; and how does a
particular litigant connect his injury to the defendant's product?293 The
Florida legislature has addressed all of these questions in the new Medicaid
Third Party Liability Act.
294
Camouflaging of the Individual
From the outset, the statute allows the individual to be removed from the
suit as much as possible. The initial stage of the legislation allows a class
286. Arizona Copper Co., Ltd., v. Hammer, 250 U.S. 400, 419 (1919).
287. Arizona Employers' Liability Law, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-801 (1993).
288. Arizona Copper Co., 250 U.S. at 418.
289. 287 U.S. 156 (1932).
290. Id. at 168. However, the court did not expand on what constituted an "available"
defense. See id.
291. State ex rel. Paoli v. Baldwin, 31 So. 2d 627 (Fla. 1947) (denial of due process by
making horse trainer an absolute insurer of ensuring horse is drug free and then revoking a
valuable license (property) if horse was found to have been drugged).
292. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd,
818 F.2d 145 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1004 (1988).
293. Paul Sherman, Agent Orange and the Problem of the Indeterminate Plaintiff 52
BROOK. L. REV. 369, 371 (1986).
294. See Medicaid Third Party Liability Act, 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 94-25 1, § 4(a),
FLA. STAT. ch. 409.10 (West 1994).
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action to be brought against the tobacco manufacturers.29 5 If the number of
Medicare and Medicaid recipients is so large that it is impracticable to iden-
tify each individual claim, the Attorney General does not have to identify each
individual claimant and can proceed with the case on behalf of the entire class
of benefit recipients as long as the circumstances involve common issues of
fact or law. 296 The description provided in the legislation appears to comport
with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, which governs class actions.2 97 The
action would probably be maintainable under Rule 23(b)(3). 29' The class
certification would seem to be the most effective and efficient manner of
determining the questions of causation and liability because these areas over-
shadow any other questions pertaining to specific individuals.
299
The respective Attorneys General (state and federal) will attempt to keep
the Medicaid and Medicare recipients together as a class.3°° This tactic would
be desirable because all of the claimants have shared the same basic type of
harm. 30 ' The dangerous aspect of this tactic is that all of the claims will share
295. 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 94-251, § 9 (West); S. 2245 § 3(a)(1)-(b)(2), 103d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
296. 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 94-25 1, § 9(a); S. 2245 § 3(b)(2), 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1994).
297. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) states: Prerequisites to a Class Action.
One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses
of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
298. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) states: Class Actions Maintainable.
An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of subdivision
(a) are satisfied, and in addition:...
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy....
299. But see Rosenfeld v. A.H. Robins Co., 407 N.Y.S.2d 196 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (refusing
to certify the class in an IUD products liability action because common question of law and
fact did not predominate citing the inability to prove individual causation), appeal dismissed,
385 N.E.2d 1301 (N.Y. 1978).
300. It has been argued that for the purpose of the determination of the relevant scientific
standard to be used in mass toxic tort cases, it is irrelevant if the cases are kept together as a
class action or tried individually. See Gerald W. Boston, A Mass-Exposure Model of Toxic
Causation: the Content of Scientific Proof and The Regulatory Experience, 18 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 181, 307 (1993) (citing the opinions of Judge Weinstein for both the class action
and the individual plaintiff cases in the Agent Orange litigation).
301. Joseph Sanders, The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass
Torts, 43 HASTINGS L. J. 301, 308 (1992). While mass torts differ from product to product,
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in the same fate.30 2 On the other hand, the counsel for tobacco companies will
desire to segregate the cases. If the defense would succeed in differentiating
the cases and gain an early victory, they would then have the doctrine of stare
decisis on their side.
30 3
But just because a suit proceeds as a class action does not guarantee
success. The problem faced by individual plaintiffs is the same in class ac-
tions - the problem of causation. 304 It has been argued that a class suit is no
more useful than a series of individual suits until the causation problem is
resolved.3 5 It appears that the new legislation has resolved the causation
problem through the use of statistical or epidemiological evidence.
Liability Connection through the Market Share Theory
The Medicaid Third Party Liability Act specifically provides for a mar-
ket share theory if the products are substantially interchangeable among
brands.30 6 Indirect support for applying this proposition to cigarettes was
given in the dissenting opinion of the Green case from the first wave of to-
bacco litigation. 307 Judge Simpson stated, "[Cigarettes] are exactly like all
others of the particular brand and virtually the same as all other brands on the
market."30 8 This type of description would help to classify cigarettes as a
fungible product,309 but tobacco may possess some distinguishing character-
istics. Even if differences exist between brands, it may still be appropriate to
apply a market share approach as long as liability attaches based upon each
manufacturers contribution to the harm that was done.
310
they are all characterized by the fact that the component cases share a single underlying type
of harm. Id.
302. Id. When a large number of claims are based on the same principles of procedure and
substance they become classified as mass tort actions. Id. Because of the factual similarity,
the claims usually share the same outcome. Id.
303. Id. at 305.
304. Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-In-Fact Rules for Indeterminate
Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 888-89 (1982).
305. Id.
306. 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 94-251 § 9(b) (West).
307. See Green v. American Tobacco Co., 391 F.2d 97, 106 (5th Cir. 1968) (Simpson, J.,
dissenting), overruled, 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970). Judge
Simpson was attempting to differentiate cigarettes from other products that were found to be
defective. Id. at 110. He described cigarettes as being without an obvious, harmful, foreign
body in the product. Id. He concluded that cigarettes were not a defective product. Id.
308. Id.
309. A fungible product is described as being identical with others of the same nature and
possessing no important traits that would easily identify the specific producer. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 675 (6th ed. 1990).
310. David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
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However, the DES plaintiffs who were successful in using the market
share theory were never able to positively identify a specific manufacturer of
the drug. 3 1 In all prior tobacco litigation, the plaintiffs were able to accom-
plish this normal requirement of tort law. 312 The Conley court indicated that
the market share liability theory would not apply where any manufacturer was
identifiable. 3 The legislature appears to have extended the use of the theory
beyond its original, judicially defined, purpose.
314
The second trait that could distinguish cigarettes is the differing levels
of tar and nicotine.315 One author has suggested that manufacturers of Agent
Orange should have been differentiated because of the varying amounts of
dioxin used in the products.31 6 He argued that no deterrence is achieved when
all manufacturers are held liable if their products actually differ.31 7 Even
though this may be a valid argument, the new legislation is not intended to be
a deterrent to the tobacco companies.31 8 The use of the market share theory
in the Florida legislation seems to ensure that all named defendants will be
liable once it is shown that cigarettes, of all types, cause health problems.
Causal Connection through Math and Science
When Prosser wrote that causation is one of the "simplest and most
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 868 (1984).
311. See supra text accompanying notes 125-44.
312. See supra p. 33 and note 206 at 36. Some plaintiffs had smoked the same brand for
many years and could even state the amount of daily consumption.
313. Lee Gunn & J. Meredith Wester, Florida's Adoption of the Market-Share Products
Liability Theory - Drugs and Beyond, 65 FLA. B. J. 37, 41 (March 1991).
314. See Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980), vacated, 607 P.2d 924
(Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
315. These differences may exist within the same brand-each Philip Morris Alpine Full
Flavor cigarette contains fifteen (15) milligrams of tar and one (1) milligram of nicotine as
compared to an Alpine Light cigarette which contains nine (9) milligrams of tar and seven-
tenths (0.7) of a milligram of nicotine. 1994 PHILIP MORRIS ADVERTISEMENT. The numbers
can be compared to Philip Morris' Benson & Hedges 100's which contain five (5) milligrams
of tar and four-tenths (0.4) of a milligram of nicotine. Id.
316. Sherman, supra note 293, at 383 n.77. Cf Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533
(Fla. 1985) (holding that a market share theory would not apply in asbestos cases due to the
lack of uniformity among products).
317. Sherman, supra note 293, at 283 n.77. If a type of risk allocation tool is applied in
these cases, such as market share liability, the burden is unfairly placed on potentially innocent
manufacturers to exculpate themselves. This burden shifting fails to give manufacturers any
incentive to reduce or eliminate the harm that could be caused by their products. Id.
318. See generally 140 Cong. Rec. S7784-04 (daily ed. June 28, 1994) (statements of Sen.
Lautenberg and Sen. Harkin). The thrust of the comments in the Record indicate a desire for
the tobacco industry to help pay for the disease that their products are inflicting on the citizens
of the United States. There is no indication for the desire to reduce or eliminate the production
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obvious" problems in the determination of tort liability," 9 it is doubtful he was
addressing the complex issues brought about by toxic tort cases. The causa-
tion requirement has avoided being reduced to a single formula, applicable in
all situations.3 20 In his article Trial by Mathematics, 32' Laurence Tribe
suggests that mathematical information must be converted from a general
application to a specific case to be useful as evidence.
3 22
The shortcoming of epidemiological statements of rates and probabili-
ties is that they apply to a group; not a specific individual. 323 The studies
produce statistics that are truly applicable only to the population represented
by the studied sample.3 24 This creates uncertainty when the results are applied
to any one individual.32 5 In absolute terms, epidemiology cannot conclusively
prove causation.32 6 However, epidemiology is the only generally accepted
scientific discipline that utilizes both statistics and medical science to estab-
lish the causes of human disease.
3 27
Because of the inability to definitively identify the cause of the disease,
the magnitude of probability required by the court will be outcome determi-
native. 328 For toxic torts, the threshold appears to be fifty percent (50%)
probability.3 29 Sufficient evidence to meet this burden should be available to
the Florida Attorney General because it has already been shown that the
incidence of lung cancer in cigarette smokers is twenty (20) times that in non-
of tobacco products. Id.
319. PROSSER, supra note 32, at 237.
320. Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1737, 1737 (1985).
321. Laurence H. Tribe, Trial By Mathematics: Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process,
84 HARV. L. REV. 1329 (1971).
322. Id. at 1346. Professor Tribe uses an example throughout his paper that relies on the
Smith case and the potential for successfully proving causation through the use of a
mathematical statement of probability. See id. at 1341 n.37.
323. Brennan, supra note 93, at 512. The author uses an example: An epidemiological
study is done to determine if a rare tumor is caused by a certain carcinogen. The results
indicate that 45% of the lung cancers observed occurred as a result of exposure to the
carcinogen. As to each individual, it is not absolute that the carcinogen caused his cancer.
Id. See, e.g., Abbott v. Mayfield, No. C-910506, 1992 WL 229522, at *34 (Ohio App. 1
Dist. 1992) (the court rejected a witness as an unqualified medical expert because as an
epidemiologist, he was not licensed to practice medicine and treat patients on an individual
basis. In footnote 2 on page 4, the court defined epidemiology as "the study of disease
patterns within populations rather than a disease pattern in an individual patient").
324. Brennan, supra note 93, at 512.
325. Id.
326. Steve Gold, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof Standards of Persuasion,
and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L. J. 376, 380 (1986).
327. Black & Lilienfeld, supra note 13, at 736.
328. Gold, supra note 326, at 384.
329. Id. at 385 n.49.
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smokers. 330 To prevail, the State must find a qualified expert (probably sev-
eral) to testify that the probability that the represented population was harmed
by smoking the cigarettes of the named defendants was fifty percent (50%) or
greater.
One strength embodied in the federal legislation is its clear statement on
the admissibility of epidemiological evidence.33' The Florida statute provides
for statistical evidence only.332 However, Florida legislators may have in-
tended the term to include epidemiological evidence since statistics and prob-
abilities play a significant role in epidemiological studies. The language of
the statute provides for a means to include, rather than to exclude, techniques
of finding liability.3 33 Federal legislators must have been concerned about
courts' acceptance of epidemiological evidence in the case of tobacco because
of the specific inclusion in the Senate bill. 334 However, since the Florida stat-
ute excluded specific language about the admissibility of epidemiological
evidence, Florida courts may interpret the statute to exclude such evidence.
A Blurred Line For The Challenge
The tobacco industry, too, has a tool available to mount a challenge:
procedural due process. As discussed earlier, this concept has never been
rigidly defined and affords the courts some room in making determinations.
The industry will group the numerous points that lessen the burden of the state
to show that the overall effect is a denial of due process. The elimination of
positive defendant identification through market share, the removal of the
individuality through a class action, and the reduction of the proof of causa-
tion through statistics or epidemiology could persuade a court to rule that the
law is unfair and offends a sense of liberty and justice.
Supporting Public Policy Arguments
In 1965, the federal government first enacted preemptive legislation in
an attempt to find a balance between the risk to the public's health from ciga-
rette smoking and the risk to the national economy if tobacco companies were
held liable for the harm caused by their products.3 5 In 1994, it is time to re-
330. Orrin E. Tilevitz, Judicial Attitudes Towards Legal and Scientific Proof of Cancer
Causation, 3 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 344, 373 (1977) citing, W. HUEPER & W.CONWAY,
CHEMICAL CARCINOGENESIS AND CANCERS 127 (1964).
331. See S. 2245, § 3(c), 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
332. See 1994 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 94-251 § 9 (West).
333. Id.
334. See S. 2245, § 3(c), 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
335. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146, 1147 (D.C.N.J. 1984), rev'd,
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examine these risks in light of the tremendous costs that society (particularly
every American taxpayer) will be required to absorb in the Medicaid pay-
ments associated with smoking-related health problems. The costs, stated as
findings of fact in the Senate bill, are simply astounding: in 1994 alone,
tobacco related illnesses and diseases will cause the Federal Government to
spend nineteen billion dollars ($19,000,000,000) in Medicare and Medicaid
in-patient hospital costs; the Medicare trust fund trustees estimated that the
fund could be insolvent by the year 2001 due to expenditures of one hundred
twenty eight billion dollars ($128,000,000,000) for diseases related to smok-
ing.3 3 6 Also, a 1992 Surgeon General's report concluded that lifetime
medical costs for smokers total $501 billion more than those incurred during
the lifetime of non-smokers.337
The balancing test pendulum may be swinging toward a finding of
tobacco manufacturer liability for good reasons. The tobacco industry has
experienced a decline in numerous areas.3 3 In terms of Gross National Prod-
uct, tobacco products have declined from approximately 0.3% of the total in
1980 to 0.07% in 1989 if constant dollars are used for the calculation.3 9 Even
789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986). From his comments, it appears that Judge Sarokin did not fully
agree with the protection offered by the preemptive Act. He stated:
The legislative history of the Act here involved reflects a candid concern for the
economy of the entire country if cigarette manufacturing were curtailed or eliminated.
One would hope that those fiscal considerations were weighed against the costs of
illness and death caused by cigarette smoking as well as the moral responsibility of
protecting the young and future generations who have not yet begun to smoke. Id.
For a recent case on the issue of protecting young people from the aggressive and
very appealing marketing techniques used by tobacco companies, see Mangini v. R. J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994) (holding that a claim under the state's unfair competition
statute to eliminate "Joe Camel" from advertisements was not barred by the preemption
clause of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act). Cf Steven W. Colford and
Ira Teinowitz, Congressman Douses Threat to Joe Camel, ADVERTISING AGE, June 13, 1994,
at 22 (focusing on the 3-2 decision of the Federal Trade Commission to stop an investigation
of R. J. Reynolds for the use of Joe Camel as an unfair marketing tool aimed at children).
336. 140 Cong. Rec. S7784-04, *S7785 (daily ed. June 28, 1994)
337. SMOKING AND HEALTH IN THE AMERICAS 136 (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Public Health Service, Centers for Disease Control, National Center for Chronic
Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Office on Smoking and Health 1992).
338. Total cigarette industry employment has fallen from 46,000 in 1980 to 34,000 in
1992. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993: THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK
420 (U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, Bureau of the
Census, 113th ed. 1993). The percentage of current users of cigarettes has declined in all age
groups, especially in the 18 to 25 year old group. Id. at 136. Based upon national samples,
48.8% of this age group were current cigarette smokers in 1974 as compared to 32.2% in
1991. Id. Another study from the Tobacco Institute cites the rate of decline in regular
smokers from 44% of Americans in 1964 to only 26% in 1990. John McLaughlin, A New
Smoking Study Has Already Lit Some Tempers, RESTAURANT BUSINESS, July 1, 1994, at 22.
339. Statistical abstract of the United States 1993: The National Data Book, supra note
40
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the percentage of tax contribution to the states' treasuries has declined from
2.7% of all state taxes collected in 1980 to 1.9% in 1991. 340
CONCLUSION
After comparing the purely economic statistics, it appears that less
emphasis should be placed on the protection of the national economy by
imposing liability on the tobacco industry. The health care costs greatly
exceed the tax benefit the states derive from the sale of cigarettes.34 ' Even
though it has been suggested that smoking may have some small positive
benefits,3 42 the current evidence overwhelmingly shows the negative effects
and costs to society.
The stakes are high for the tobacco industry. The once powerful lobbies,
such as the National Rifle Association, do not have the same clout that they
once enjoyed. A new warning has been issued by the Florida legislature and
the fire is burning brighter.3 43 Will anyone come to the rescue or will more
fuel be added to the fire? It appears that the Medicaid Third-Party Liability
Act will accomplish its goal of recovering money for smoking-related illness
unless the higher courts decide to extinguish the flames.
SCOTT RICHARDSON
341, at 443. The data used was current as of 1991 and the calculation is based upon 1982
constant dollars.
340. Id. at 302. Total state taxes collected from all sources in 1980 amounted to
$137,075,000,000. Tobacco products contributed $3,738,000,000. In 1991, total state tax
collections totaled $310,561,000,000. Of this amount, $5,980,000,000 can be attributed to
tobacco products. Id.
341. The author realizes that the industry contributes corporate income tax as well as
generating personal income taxes from the employees. However, it seems that most of this
economic benefit is realized by a few select states where the tobacco industry calls home. In
1992, the states that harvested the largest acreage of tobacco are (in descending order): North
Carolina, Kentucky, Tennessee, South Carolina, Virginia, and Georgia, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1993: THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK, supra note 341, at
670.
342. See Peter Brimelow, Thank You For Smoking... ?, FORBES, July 4, 1994, at 80. The
article states that cigarette smoking may be beneficial in controlling behavior (based on the
stimulant) and a reducing the incidence of Parkinson's disease, Alzheimer's disease,
endometrial cancer, prostate cancer, osteoarthritis, colon cancer, and ulcerative colitis. Id. at
80-81. Numerous studies are mentioned that show a 30% to 50% decrease of these diseases
among smokers versus non-smokers. Id.
343. See Mark Curriden, The Heat Is On, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1994, at 58-61. The article
explores the next potential wave of litigation by private plaintiffs due to the recent testimony
of tobacco industry executives and the rulings of a House of Representative's subcommittee.
A number of renowned plaintiffs attorneys are forming a well funded and well organized
coalition to challenge the industry based upon fraud and deceit claims evolving from early
company studies that reveal knowledge of the harm and dangers of the cigarette.
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